infinite
ion
private in the RePUBLIC
private: Membership Only!
Membership by invitation only.
Know the Words to the Game!
PUBLIC
v.
private
PUBLIC
PUBLIC
PUBLIC. By the term the public, is meant the whole body politic, or all the citizens of the state; sometimes it signifies the inhabitants of a particular place; as, the New York public.
2. A distinction has been made between the terms public and general, they are sometimes used as synonymous. The former term is applied strictly to that which concerns all the citizens and every member of the state; while the latter includes a lesser, though still a large portion of the community.
Greenl. Ev. Sec. 128.
3. When the public interests and its rights conflict with those of an individual, the latter must yield. Co. Litt. 181. if, for example, a road is required for public convenience, and in its course it passes on the ground occupied by a house, the latter must be torn down, however valuable it may be to the owner. In such a case both law and justice require that the owner shall be fully indemnified.
4. This term is sometimes joined to other terms, to designate those things which have a relation to the public; as, a public officer, a public road, a public passage, a public house.
Source: Bouvier Law Dictionary 1856
28 U.S. Code § 3002 – Definitions
(15)“United States” means—
1 U.S. Code § 8 – “Person”, “human being”, “child”, and “individual” as including born-alive infant
15 U.S. Code § 7 – “Person” or “persons” defined
The word “person”, or “persons”, wherever used in sections 1 to 7 of this title shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the UnitedStates, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country.
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201. General Definitions.
(27) “Person“ means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity.
private
private
private. Not general, as a private act of the legislature; not in office; as, a private person, as well as an officer, may arrest a felon; individual, as your private interest; not public, as a private way, a private nuisance.
Source: Bouvier Law Dictionary 1856
Sui Juris
Definition and Citations:
Lat. Of his own right; possessing full social and civil rights; not under any legal disability, or the power of another, or guardianship. Having capacity to manage one’s own affairs; not under legal disability to act for one’s self. Story, Ag.
Source: The Law Dictionary
Know the Words to the Game!
. . . and to the RePublic for which it stands,
one nation under God,
with Liberty . . . for all.
. . . Re-
Prefixed to a word beginning with e, re- is separated by a hyphen, as re-establish, re-estate, re-edify, etc. ; or else the second e has a dieresis over it: as, reëstablish, reëmbark, etc. The hyphen is also sometimes used to bring out emphatically the sense of repetition or iteration : as, sung and re-sung. The dieresis is not used over other vowels than e when re is prefixed : thus, reinforce, reunite, reabolish. [Century Dictionary, 1895]
Source: etymology.com
PLEDGE OF A NATION!
. . . Pledge
. . . Allegiance
Definition and Citations:
THELAW.COM LAW DICTIONARY & BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 2ND ED.
By allegiance Is meant the obligation of fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives. It may be an absolute and permanent obligation, or it may be a qualified and temporary one. The citizen or subject owes an absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign, or at least until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces it and becomes a citizen or subject of another government or another sovereign. The alien, while domiciled in the country, owes a local and temporary allegiance, which continues during the period of his residence. Carlisle v. U. S., 16 Wall. 154, 21 L. Ed. 426; Jackson v. Goodell, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 191; U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 18 Sup. Ct 456, 42 L. Ed. 890; Wallace v. Harmstad, 44 Pa. 501. “The tie or ligamen which binds the subject [or citizen] to the king [or government in return for that protection which the king [or government] affords the subject, [or citizen.”] 1 Bl. Comm. 366. It consists in “a true and faithful obedience of the subject due to his sovereign.” 7 Coke, 46. Allegiance is the obligation of fidelity and obedience which every citizen owes to the state. Pol. Code Cal.
Words to the Game!
How is status determined, legally?
By voluntarily taking Benefits and Privileges, through Novation, we create an Implied Contract with the Federal Corporation and grant them Plenary Power over our corporate Person and Property.
. . . novation
A novation is an agreement made between two contracting parties to allow for the substitution of a new party for an existing one. The original contracting party who is replaced by the new party with the novation is excused by the novation, and therefore the original party who is replaced gives up any rights they have against the other original party to the contract. Both original contracting parties must agree to the novation.
Generally, novation is sometimes called a substituted contract. In this context, a novation is a new obligation that extinguishes and replaces an old contract or obligation . Novation can be used as a defense against anyclaim from the old agreement because the old agreement is void . While both novation and substituted contracts are replacing old contracts with new contracts, novation can be used for substitution of parties specifically.
Novation is governed by the choice of law provision in each contract that determines which state’s laws apply. Where no provision exists, novation will be governed by the relevant jurisdiction .
See also: assign
[Last updated in August of 2023 by the Wex Definitions Team ]
. . . plenary power
. . . implied contract
Both express contracts and implied contracts are legally enforceable promises of mutual assent to be bound, see U.C.C. § 1-201 . An express contract is communicated orally or in writing, which requires expressing assent . An implied contract, which does not have explicitly stated terms, is still found to exist because parties assumed a contract existed based on conduct, or denying the contract’s existence would result in unjust enrichment to one of the parties. An implied contract is divided into Implied-in-fact contract and Implied-in-law contract.
Implied-in-fact contract
An implied-in-fact contract is formed when parties’ promises are inferred from their intentional conduct and one party knows or at least has reason to know the other party will interpret the conduct as assent or an agreement. For instance, if a customer accepts services from a merchant or gets products from that merchant, then they should pay for the reasonable value of services or products (e.g., barbershop, vending machine). However, under some circumstances, even if a defendant has received nothing of value, the implied-in-fact contract can still be enforced.
Implied-in-law contract (Quasi contract)
An implied-in-law contract is the restitution recovery at law, which imposes a legal obligation to an unjustly enriched party to compensate the other party. It is not only applied when there is no contract but also applied when there is a total breach of contract. There are no requirements for the meeting of the minds or mutual assent. Once the plaintiff has conferred a measurable benefit on the defendant without gratuitous intent and the defendant gets the unjust enrichment, the court will imply a quasi contract as a method of recovery . The measure of recovery is not the contract price, but the reasonable fair value of the benefit conferred.
Unjust enrichment or unfairness arises when the defendant has the opportunity to decline the benefit but instead knowingly accepts it. However, if the plaintiff has an excuse for not giving the defendant such an opportunity (e.g., rescuing someone in an emergency), he or she also has the right of claiming remedy.
Instead of being governed by contract law, the implied-in-law contract is governed by equitable relief .
Compare: express contract
[Last updated in March of 2022 by the Wex Definitions Team ]
. . . Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause refers to Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution , which gives Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among states, and with the Indian tribes.”
Congress has often used the Commerce Clause to justify exercising legislative power over the activities of states and their citizens, leading to significant and ongoing controversy regarding the balance of power between the federal government and the states. The Commerce Clause has historically been viewed as both a grant of congressional authority and as a restriction on the regulatory authority of the States.
The Constitution does not explicitly define the word “commerce” leading to wide debate as to what powers section 8, Clause 3 grants congress. Some argue that it refers simply to trade or exchange, while others claim that the framers of the Constitution intended to describe more broadly commercial and social intercourse between citizens of different states.
Courts have generally taken a broad interpretation of the commerce clause for much of United States history. In 1824’s Gibbons v. Ogden , the Supreme Court held that intrastate activity could be regulated under the Commerce Clause, provided that the activity is part of a larger interstate commercial scheme. In 1905’s Swift and Company v. United States , the Supreme Court held that Congress had the authority to regulate local commerce, as long as that activity could become part of a continuous “current” of commerce that involved the interstate movement of goods and services.
For a brief period between 1905 and 1937, the Supreme Court narrowed their interpretation of the Commerce Clause in what has now become known as the Lochner era . Courts during this era experimented with the idea that the Commerce Clause does not empower congress to pass laws which impede an individual’s right to enter a business contract.
However, beginning with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp in 1937, the Court began to recognize broader grounds upon which the Commerce Clause could be used to regulate state activity. Most importantly, the Supreme Court held that activity was commerce if it had a “substantial economic effect” on interstate commerce or if the “cumulative effect” of one act could have an effect on such commerce. Decisions such as NLRB v. Jones,United States v. Darby , and Wickard v. Filburn demonstrated the Court’s newfound willingness to give an unequivocally broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause. From the NLRB decision in 1937 until 1995, the Supreme Court did not invalidate a single law on the basis of overstepping the Commerce Clause’s grant of power.
In United States v. Lopez (1995) the Supreme Court attempted to curtail Congress’s broad legislative mandate under the Commerce Clause by returning to a more conservative interpretation of the clause. In Lopez , the defendant was charged with carrying a handgun to school in violation of the federal Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 . The defendant argued that the federal government had no authority to regulate firearms in local schools, while the government claimed that this fell under the Commerce Clause on grounds that possession of a firearm in a school zone would lead to violent crime, thereby affecting general economic conditions. The Supreme Court rejected the government’s argument, holding that Congress only has the power to regulate the channels of commerce, the instrumentalities of commerce, and action that substantially affects interstate commerce . The Court declined to further expand the Commerce Clause, writing that “[t]o do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local. This we are unwilling to do.”
Nonetheless, Lopez did not indicate a full return to the Lochner era conception of the Commerce Clause. For example, in Gonzales v. Raich , the Court returned to its more liberal construction of the Commerce Clause in relation to intrastate production when it upheld federal regulation of intrastate marijuana production.
In 2012, the Supreme Court again addressed the Commerce Clause in NFIB v. Sebelius . In Sebelius , the Court addressed the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) , which required uninsured individuals to secure health insurance or pay a monetary penalty in an attempt to stabilize the health insurance market. Focusing on Lopez ‘s requirement that Congress regulate only commercial activity, the Court held that the individual mandate could not be enacted under the Commerce Clause. The Court stated that requiring the purchase of health insurance under the ACA was not the regulation of commercial activity so much as inactivity and was, accordingly, impermissible under the Commerce Clause. Nonetheless, the individual mandate was allowed to stand because it could reasonably be characterized as a tax.
While most discussion surrounding the Commerce Clause revolves around the federal government, it indirectly also affects state governments through what’s known as the Dormant Commerce Clause . The Dormant Commerce Clause refers to the prohibition, implicit in the Commerce Clause, against states passing legislation that discriminates against or excessively burdens interstate commerce. Of particular importance is the prevention of protectionist state policies that favor state citizens or businesses at the expense of non-citizens conducting business within that state. For example, in West Lynn Creamery Inc. v. Healy the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts state tax on milk products because the tax impeded interstate commercial activity by discriminating against non-Massachusetts citizens and businesses.
[Last updated in July of 2022 by the Wex Definitions Team ]
. . . Uniform Commercial Code
Copyright 1978, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2010, 2011, 2012 by The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; reproduced, published and distributed with the permission of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code for the limited purposes of study, teaching, and academic research.
Our collection aims to show each section of the U.C.C. in the version which is most widely adopted by states. That means we will not always display the most current revision if that revision has not achieved widespread adoption among American legislatures.
[Due to license restrictions, this on-line version of the U.C.C. does not include the official comments.]
[We also offer the U.C.C. as enacted by a particular state and proposed revisions to articles.]
. . . Illinois Uniform Commercial Code
810 ILCS 5/
Source: Illinois General Assembly
*Check your state for their codified version of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Note: infinite ion has no affiliation with any links provided for the reader’s convenience.
It’s Just Contracts and Trusts!
To review, by voluntarily taking Benefits and Privileges and not rebutting or counterclaims challenging the Assumptions or Presumptions, through Novation, Marriage Certification, Birth Certification and Social Security Application, we create Implied Contracts with the ‘Federal Corporation,’ all of its subsidiaries, “a college of corporations,” and grant it Plenary Power over our corporate Person and our private Property which can include our children reinforced with every registration and certification.